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Abstract
There is a longstanding concern that material rewards might undermine pro-social motiva-
tions, thereby leading to a decrease in blood donations. This paper provides an empirical
test of how material rewards affect blood donations in a three-month large-scale field experi-
ment and a fifteen-month follow-up period, involving more than 10,000 previous donors. We
examine the efficacy of a lottery ticket as a reward vis-a`-vis a standard invitation, an appeal,
and a free cholesterol test. The offer of a lottery ticket, on average, increases the probability
to donate blood during the experiment by 5.6 percentage points over a baseline donation
rate of 46 percent. We find that this effect is driven by less motivated donors. Moreover, no
reduction in donations is observed after the experiment.
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I. Introduction
In medical emergencies, blood transfusions are often the only way to save individuals’ lives (Hig-
gins, 1994). A sufficient supply of donated blood is thus a matter of life and death. Whole blood
cannot yet be produced artificially, and some components of blood can only be stored for a short
period of time. Moreover, the amount an individual can donate is limited. As such, in order
to meet the need for blood, a wide and healthy base of donors, who are willing to give blood
when required, is needed. Historically, many blood donation services have relied on voluntary,
non-remunerated donations and thus on the pro-social motivations of their donors (Slonim et
al., 2014).1 Despite the inherent free-rider problem of this policy, the arrangement seems to have
worked satisfactorily most of the time. However, it also faces serious challenges. New techniques
in surgeries and oncological therapies require larger amounts of blood (Davey, 2004). There is
also a general tightening of eligibility criteria, such as stepped-up travel restrictions and restric-
tions on past blood recipients. Finally, there are widespread seasonal shortages experienced by
hospitals (Gilcher and McCombs, 2005).
In this paper, we present evidence on whether rewards can be used to overcome blood short-
ages in an environment that relies primarily on the pro-social motivations of voluntary donors.
Most economic models, including those incorporating pro-social preferences explicitly (for ex-
ample, Andreoni, 1990) predict that selective incentives will increase blood donations.2 Yet,
there remains a deep-rooted skepticism pertaining to the use of incentives in blood donations,
even on a temporary basis. This skepticism is based on the conjecture that using incentives may
1While whole-blood donations are generally unpaid in developed countries (World Health Organization, 2017),
there are some countries where plasma donations, which can be offered frequently, are paid. Indeed, Trimmel,
Lattacher and Janda (2005) find that, using survey measures, whole-blood donors are broadly more pro-socially
motivated than plasma donors. Intriguingly, no difference was found in the survey when comparing whole-blood
donors with plasma donors who would be willing to continue donating plasma if no longer paid. Similar differences
were found when comparing whole-blood donors with the general population (Ferna´ndez Montoya et al., 1996).
See Piliavin (1990) for additional references.
2We use the term incentive to describe an external intervention affecting the relative attractiveness of alter-
native options with no specific reference to the substance of the incentive. Instead, when we refer to rewards, we
consider specific incentives, i.e. quid pro quo offers in a voluntary exchange.
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undermine the motivation to donate blood.3,4
Research in psychology and economics has proposed that incentives can lead to less pro-
social behavior. If rewards are perceived as controlling, incentives may undermine pro-social
motivations. This is often referred to in the literature as the motivation crowding effect (Deci
and Ryan, 1985; Frey, 1997; Lepper and Greene, 1978). There is ample evidence from various
contexts in support of this mechanism (see the reviews by Frey and Jegen 2001; Gneezy et al.
2011; Kamenica 2012) and it has repeatedly been discussed in the context of blood donation
policy (see, e.g., Archard 2002; Lacetera et al. 2013; Stutzer and Goette 2010). However, the
specific evidence is less clear. In a comprehensive review of the literature on the use of incentives
to stimulate blood donation, Chell et al. (2018) conclude that many issues remain unresolved.
One of the reasons they emphasize is that the research is “confounded by current operating
context” (p. 251).5
Our natural field experiment allows us to study the effects of material rewards in a controlled
context that is particularly attractive to pit the theoretical predictions of a standard economics
model against a model of motivation crowding.6 In our study, we randomized the offer of rewards
to roughly 10,000 blood donors who were previously not offered any kind of reward in exchange
for their blood. We can thus learn about the impact of incentives on individuals who chose
to donate blood in the absence of compensation. Our data include donation records of these
individuals before, during, and after the experiment. The experimental design not only allows
us to evaluate how the motivation to donate blood changes i) when incentives are applied, but
also ii) for the period after being exposed to incentives. The data on donation behavior before
the experiment provides us with a natural measure of how motivated individuals are to donate
3This conjecture is associated with Titmuss (1971), who famously argued, “From our study of the private
market in blood in the United States, we have concluded that the commercialization of blood donor relationships
represses the expression of altruism, erodes the sense of community, [...]” (p. 245).
4A second concern is that using incentives may attract at-risk donors. This concern holds great relevance
to new donors (Eastlund, 1998; Sanchez et al., 2001; Van der Poel et al., 2002). As our experiment studies the
behavioral reactions of previous donors, we focus on the effects of incentives on contributions and refer to the
working paper (Goette and Stutzer 2008) for an analysis of the selection issue.
5Other reviews and narrative summaries are offered in Bagot et al. (2016), Goette et al. (2010), Lacetera et
al. (2013), and Niza et al. (2013).
6The criticism of lab experiments by Levitt and List (2007) makes the conditions of our field experiment
particularly desirable, as the participants did not know they were involved in a study.
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blood in the absence of incentives.
In our key experimental condition, individuals were offered a lottery ticket in return for
donating blood over a pre-specified time window. This information was presented on a postcard
which came with the standard invitation letter that individuals were used to receive.
A lottery ticket was chosen as a reward as it is nearly as fungible as a monetary payment. We
complemented the lottery ticket treatment with three control conditions. In the first condition,
individuals were offered a free cholesterol test, which was also communicated to them via a
postcard. The cost of the cholesterol test to the SRC was roughly the same as that of the
lottery ticket. This condition thus controls for being offered a reward of similar costs, but not
fungibility. Moreover, we chose the health domain so that the reward was in the same dimension,
in the sense that donors contribute to other people’s health. In the second condition, individuals
received the standard invitation and an additional postcard, asking them to donate during the
same time period as in the two reward conditions. This condition controls for possible effects of
the perceived urgency of donating blood (Bruhin et al., 2015; Sun et al., 2016). The third control
condition consisted of only the standard invitation letter to establish the baseline donation rate.
Importantly, our subjects were not aware that a study was being conducted. The invitation
letters were mailed privately to the donors, and donations occurred in the anonymity of a
medical center or hospital, so that public image concerns are largely excluded in our experiment
(see Lacetera and Macis, 2010, for a demonstration of the relevance of public-image concerns
in blood donations). Thus, our experiment can be viewed as a test of psychological crowding
theories related to intrinsic motivation or self-signaling (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006).
In a previous paper, we had already shown that the free cholesterol test has no systematic
effect on donations during the experiment (Goette et al., 2009).7 However, the earlier paper
focused on the disconnect between attitudes and behavior in the evaluation of free cholesterol
testing as a means to encourage donors to donate blood more often. The present study examines
the impact of fungible rewards, and the potential interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic
7In addition, the earlier paper also reports evidence from a separate experiment testing the effectiveness of the
cholesterol test in recruiting “novice” donors who had never given blood before.
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motivators in donation behavior. In particular, we examine the impact of the lottery ticket and
test whether it affects behavior differently from the other three conditions. In addition, we study
the long-term effects of offering material rewards on the probability of donating blood.
The overall picture that emerges from our experiment is that material rewards have no general
negative effects, both during the experiment and in the long-term. On the contrary, when looking
at the overall experimental outcomes, we find that offering a lottery ticket increases donations
by 5.6 percentage points over a baseline donation rate of 46 percent. In contrast, we find no
economically and statistically significant effect of the free cholesterol test (as reported in Goette
et al., 2009), and the simple appeal to donate on behavior during the experiment.
We also show that the treatment effects vary between subsamples in interesting ways. Our
treatment effects are entirely driven by individuals who previously had a low motivation to
donate blood. Even though this group has a low baseline donation rate of about 30 percent,
offering a lottery ticket increases the probability of donating blood by around 8 percentage
points. In contrast, there is essentially no incentive effect on donors who had previously shown
a high motivation to donate blood. This pattern suggests that heterogeneity in the motivation
for blood donation modulates the impact of incentives.
When we examine different splits of the sample, such as by age, gender, or regularity of the
invitation schedule chosen, we find no significant differences in the responses to the treatments
between these subsamples. This reinforces our interpretation that differences in the motivation
to donate blood are the driving force behind the different responses.
In addition, our design allows us to examine whether the material rewards changed pro-
social motivations in the long run by following the donors up to 15 months after the conclusion
of the experiment. After the experiment, donations generated from people who were incentivized
during the experiment are no lower than those generated from people who received the rewards
unexpectedly, and the precision of our estimates allows us to reject even small negative effects.
The findings from our study contribute to the understanding of which operating contexts
offer a fruitful ground for applying incentives, and highlight other areas where results across
studies are more discordant (Chell et al., 2018). Perhaps surprisingly, the results are consistent
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with previous evidence pertaining to the use of monetary or near-monetary rewards such as
stored-value cards. Lacetera et al. (2012) and Lacetera et al. (2014) show that such rewards
reliably lead to higher turnout in blood drives of the American Red Cross (ARC). Importantly,
the individuals in these two studies are used to receiving some form of reward.8 The results from
our study population, on which material rewards had not been used before, are very similar.
By contrast, there are large differences in how other forms of rewards affect blood donations.
As pointed out, the offer of a free cholesterol test does not have a positive effect on donation
rates, both overall and in any of the subpopulations that we examined. This sharply contrasts
with the findings in Leipnitz et al. (2018), which uses a difference-in-differences strategy to assess
the effectiveness of offering blood screening on donations. They find large positive effects from
offering a blood check as a reward.
Furthermore, we find that merely appealing to previous donors to give blood has some
positive effect for individuals with a relatively low baseline motivation. Another recent study by
Sun et al. (2016) finds strong positive effects of a similar message that was delivered by a text
message (rather than postal mail as in our case).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the empirical
setup of our study, explains the details of the treatments, and offers some descriptive statistics.
Section III discusses the behavioral predictions for the different treatments. The section also
elaborates on how the standard model, augmented by a dynamic mechanism to allow for habit
formation or guilt, can produce long-run responses to temporary incentives. Section IV presents
the results of the donation behavior during and after the experimental intervention. Section V
offers concluding remarks.
II. The Empirical Setup
We conducted a large-scale field experiment spanning three months during the summer of 2006
in four blood donation centers in the canton of Zurich, Switzerland. The study was conducted
8Lacetera et al. (2014) state that “[b]ecause about 40% of ARC drives offer a promotional item, and most
flyers show at least one drive with a promotion, the reward offers should not be perceived as unusal” (p. 1111).
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in close collaboration with the Zurich Blood Donation Service of the Swiss Red Cross (Stiftung
Zu¨rcher Blutspendedienst, henceforth SRC). The subjects participating in the field experiment
were individuals registered in the database of the blood donation service.
If an individual has previously donated blood in one of the four donation services, he or
she is registered in the database of the SRC. The individual is subsequently invited to donate
blood again at one of the four donation centers (the center is determined by proximity to the
town the individual lives in). The donors are mailed a standard invitation giving a specific date,
approximately three weeks prior to the appointment, in order to avoid congestion at the donation
center. The SRC starts inviting eligible individuals four months after their last invitation (or
longer, if the donors so indicate) and sends these invitations in no particular order. If an
individual fails to respond to seven consecutive invitations, the SRC stops sending invitations
to them.
Figure 1 graphs the frequency with which the invited blood donors responded to the invita-
tion in the 12 months before the experiment began in May 2006. It shows that the fraction of
individuals donating blood subsequent to receiving an invitation is quite volatile, and between
40 and 50 percent in most months.9 Figure 2 shows the overall donation rate during the ex-
periment. It is 47 percent and thus slightly higher than the average donation rate during the
corresponding months one year earlier. The figure also reveals important persistent differences
in the motivation to donate blood across donors. Restricted to donors who have received at
least four invitations prior to the experiment, we display the fraction of individuals responding
to the invitation during the experiment as a function of the number of previous invitations they
responded to. The figure shows that of those who followed none of the 4 previous invitations,
only about 15 percent donated during the experiment. This fraction increases monotonically
to over 80 percent for those who had followed all four previous invitations. This is strongly
indicative of heterogeneity between donors, and the figure suggests that the number of previous
invitations responded to is a strong predictor of the overall willingness to donate blood during
9A few donations are also collected from spontaneous donors. We omit those from the statistics as they are
subsequently not part of the experiment.
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the experiment. It is important to note that in each group, there is ample room to adjust do-
nations upward or downward. Thus, mechanical “ceiling effects” are unlikely to play a role in
our experiment.
Figure 1: Propensity to Donate Blood Following an Invitation Prior to the Field Experiment
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Source: Own calculations based on data from the SRC.
A. Treatments
We implemented four experimental groups. One group served as the control to identify the
effects of the control variables and these individuals were invited as usual. The remaining three
groups received the standard invitation letter with an additional feature: for each of the three
treatments, a postcard was included. The face side of the post card read ”This summer, you
can make a difference.” The reverse side bore a general message as well as one specific to the
treatment applied. In all treatments, it was explained that the blood donation service found it
difficult to meet demand during the summer, and that this might possibly lead to significant
7
Figure 2: Propensity to Donate Blood During the Field Experiment
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Note: The sample is restricted to the 9,731 donors who have received at least four previous
invitations to donate blood.
shortages. In the appeal treatment, the card then stated
“In order to prevent this, we are particularly relying on your voluntary donation
during the summer months. We therefore especially invite you with this call to
donate blood.
Many thanks!
Zurich Blood Donation Service SRC”
In the second treatment, in addition to the information provided in the appeal treatment, a
free cholesterol test was offered. Specifically, the following sentence was added to the card:
“In appreciation of your donation, this summer we offer you the opportunity to check
your cholesterol level free of charge at the blood donation center.”
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In the third treatment, the subjects were offered a lottery ticket. The text on the card was
supplemented with the following:
“In appreciation of your donation, this summer you will receive a lottery ticket from
the Swiss State Lottery.”
The retail value of the cholesterol check was CHF 15 (approx. 12 Euros), while that of
the lottery ticket was CHF 5 (approx. 4 Euros). The lottery ticket was low-yield, but with a
higher probability of winning (the probability of winning CHF 10 or more was approximately
30 percent).
It was a requirement of the centers’ board that all blood donors showing up at a donation
center be treated equally. For this reason, we had to implement the second treatments (the
cholesterol test) and the third one (the lottery ticket) in different donation centers. As the
board was most interested in the effectiveness of the cholesterol test as a retention reward,
this particular reward was offered in three centers. The lottery ticket was offered in only one
center (the second largest). The equal treatment implies that, upon showing up at the donation
center, all blood donors were offered, depending on the center, a lottery ticket or a cholesterol
test irrespective of whether this was advertised to them in the invitation. Notice also that the
baseline and appeal conditions were implemented in each of the centers. The sequence of the
treatments was randomized over days; i.e., only one treatment was mailed out per day due
to administrative considerations. Thus, the treatment was randomized only within weeks and
within donation centers. This constraint has important implications for the randomization of
our treatments. It requires us to control for donation center, week, and weekday in the empirical
analysis below, and has implications for the correction of standard errors.
B. Descriptive Statistics
In total, our baseline sample comprises 11,320 blood donors who were mailed an invitation
during the experiment. Table 1 displays information on the basic demographics, as well as the
past donation frequency of the blood donors who were invited during the experiment. The first
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line in the table shows that the mean age in the sample is about 44 years and approximately 40
percent of the donors are female.
The second line in the table restricts attention to the blood donors who have received at least
four previous invitations. This subsample will be used to study heterogeneous treatment effects
between frequent and infrequent donors. As can be seen, there are only minor differences between
the donors in the base sample and the ones in the subsample: the main difference is that donors
in the latter sample are about one year older than the average. Table 1 also shows the frequency
with which individuals have donated in response to the last four invitations (or the last four or
fewer invitations in the base sample). The average frequency of donations in response to four
invitations is 1.97. The standard deviation of 1.55 suggests that there is strong heterogeneity
between donors in the probability with which they respond to an invitation. Looking further
into heterogeneity in the subsample (not reported in the table), we find that 27 percent have
not responded to any of the four previous invitations. About 15 percent have responded once,
twice or thrice, respectively, to the past four invitations, and nearly 25 percent have donated
each time they were invited to. The subset of donors with at least four previous invitations
is our preferred sample, as it allows us to control for heterogeneity in baseline motivation in a
parsimonious way.
Turning to the distribution of treatments, Table A2 in the Appendix gives an overview of the
number of invitations sent out per treatment overall and by center. A free cholesterol test was
offered to about one third of the invited donors. About one tenth received an invitation offering
a lottery ticket. As the latter reward was only offered in one of the four donation centers, the
lottery ticket experimental group is smaller.
The bottom part of Table 1 provides a randomization check for the observable characteris-
tics. The table shows that there are small differences across treatments with respect to age and
previous donations, possibly due to the coarse randomization procedure. In order to examine
this observation in more detail, we perform balancing checks for the observable characteristics.
As the treatment was randomized within centers and between days, we control for center-specific
week effects in these randomization checks. Moreover, the opening hours of the centers differ by
10
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Age Gender Donations Signed up for N
(female = 1) following last fixed interval
four invitations of inv. (=1)
Overall sample
Full sample 43.52 0.41 – 0.33 11,141
(14.14) (0.49) – (0.47)
Sample with at least 44.77 0.39 1.97 0.35 9,731
four previous invitations (13.87) (0.49) (1.55) (0.48)
By treatment
Baseline 44.98 0.40 1.98 0.37 2,973
(13.73) (0.49) (1.54) (0.48)
Appeal 45.66 0.40 2.11 0.35 2,224
(13.84) (0.49) (1.54) (0.48)
Cholesterol test 44.12 0.38 1.90 0.26 3,544
(13.96) (0.49) (1.56) ( 0.44)
Lottery ticket 44.47 0.38 1.83 0.63 990
(13.92) (0.49) (1.53) (0.48)
Balance checks
Test for full sample 0.04 0.59 0.03 0.58
(p-value)
Overall p-value for 0.19
all four characteristics
Test for sample with at least 0.06 0.86 0.07 0.86
four previous invitations (p-value)
Overall p-value for 0.42
all four characteristics
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Descriptive statistics by treatment
condition are calculated based on the sample with at least four previous invitations. The p-
values for balance checks are obtained from seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model for the
four characteristics.
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weekday. We therefore also control for center × weekday effects. The randomization check is
implemented by estimating a set of seemingly unrelated regressions taking into account the cor-
relation in the residuals across equations when calculating the covariance matrix. The p-values
from these regressions are also shown in Table 1. We detect that there are small and marginally
statistically significant imbalances with respect to age and previous donations. However, the
overall F-test of balance across all four equations, also taking into account cross-correlations in
the four characteristics, shows no statistically significant evidence of imbalance. This holds, in
particular, for the sample restricted to individuals with four previous invitations for donations.
In addition, Table A1 in the Appendix provides the descriptive statistics by treatment across
the centers. It reveals that while there are some differences between centers, randomization was
also successful within each center.
III. Behavioral Predictions
This section examines the predictions of different theories regarding the response of blood dona-
tions to incentives. The predictions concern (i) how individuals respond to material rewards and
other kind of incentives in general, (ii) how differential donor motivation moderates the response
to incentives during the experiment, and (iii) how the predictions of behavior subsequent to the
experiment differ. In the first subsection, we examine different versions of the standard model
in economics and explain their predictions concerning the use of incentives to encourage blood
donation. Inspired by research in psychology, we also consider alternative theories of ”motiva-
tional crowding” (Frey, 1997), which suggest that the use of monetary incentives can backfire
in a sense to be made precise. In the second subsection, we describe the empirical strategy.
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A. Theory
The Baseline Model: We begin by discussing a stripped-down economic model of blood dona-
tions. To fix ideas, suppose that the utility from donating blood is given by
ui(di) = (vi − c)di (1)
where di = 1 indicates that individual i donates blood and di = 0 indicates that she does not.
The parameter vi is the individual’s benefit from donating blood as derived from altruism or
warm-glow (see, e.g., Andreoni, 1990, 2007; Wildman and Hollingsworth, 2009). vi may differ
between individuals reflecting heterogeneity in pro-social motivations. The parameter c is the
cost of donating blood as reflected in the time costs and other possible utility costs associated
with donating blood. The cost c is random with cumulative distribution function Fc() with
support [0, c¯] reflecting that not each day may be equally convenient to donate blood.
In the absence of incentives, the fraction of individuals donating blood is the fraction of
individuals for which c < vi. This is given by the fraction q =
∫ v¯
0 Fc(z)dG(z), where G()
is the distribution function of vi. The model naturally predicts an increase in donations as
positive incentives are used. Denote the utility from the incentive by m. Then, individuals
will donate blood if c < vi + m, and the fraction of individuals donating blood will change by
∆q =
∫ v¯
0 (Fc(z +m)− Fc(z)) dG(z) ≥ 0. The model, as such is silent on what constitutes an
incentive. It could be anything that has consumption value for the individual. In our experiment,
we offer two types of potential incentives: a lottery ticket and a cholesterol test. As such, it is
not clear which of the two is expected to have a stronger impact on behavior, as the utility of
the two rewards to the individuals would need to be known.
The model can also be used to derive conditions under which highly motivated donors
(deriving a high benefit v from donating blood) respond differently to incentives in a sys-
tematic way from donors who are less motivated. As the model makes clear, differences in
response to the same incentive are related to the distribution of opportunity costs as well
as the benefits from donating blood. Consider the case of a negative correlation between
13
costs and benefits. For example, there are two types of individuals with benefits v and
v′ > v and the density of the cost function is higher at fc(v) than at fc(v′). It follows that
the change in the probability to donate blood will be higher for individuals of type v, as
Fc(v + m) − Fc(v) =
∫m
0 fc(v + z)dz ≥
∫m
0 fc(v
′ + z)dz = Fc(v′ + m) − Fc(v′). The reverse
holds for the case of a positive correlation between costs and benefits.
Importantly, the standard model also makes the prediction that incentives only affect be-
havior while they are in place. Once the incentives are removed, donations will return to their
baseline level.
Intertemporal Utility Spillovers: This last property, however, need not hold in the presence of
intertemporal spillovers on utility. For instance, suppose that the utility from donating blood
in period t takes the form
u(dt, dt−1) =
 dt(v − ct) if dt−1 = 0dt(αv − ct) if dt−1 = 1 (2)
ignoring possible differences in v across individuals, and assuming an infinitely-lived individual
with discount factor δ < 1 between periods. In contrast to equation (1), equation (2) illustrates
a case in which past behavior has a direct effect on the utility of donating blood today: if the
individual has donated in period t− 1, the benefit from donating today is αv, while the benefit
from donating is v if she has not donated in period t − 1. Several specifications are possible.
Consider first the case where α < 1. This corresponds to the case of ”guilt-driven” preferences,
i.e. the intuition that individuals feel more strongly that they should donate the more time has
elapsed since their last donation. This implies that it feels less urgent to donate in the current
period if the individual has donated in the last period, with α < 1 indicating the ”discounted”
motivation due to the previous donation.
Consider now the effect of incentives on behavior. As we show in the appendix, if dt−1 = 0,
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the individual will find it optimal to donate if
c ≤ v +m+ δ [E(V 1)− E(V 0)]
where E(V 1) and E(V 0) are the discounted expected lifetime utility starting with dt = 1, 0,
respectively, in period t+ 1. Thus, as before, the individual will be more likely to donate when
there is an added incentive to the blood donation. However this donation is going to have an
effect on the decision to donate in the next period. In period t + 1, the individual has dt = 1
and will donate if
c ≤ αv + δ [E(V 1)− E(V 0)]
Thus, if the individual has donated after being exposed to incentives in the last period, she is
less likely to donate this period since it now feels less urgent to donate blood. In other words,
α < 1 may lead to a behavior that looks like ”intertemporal substitution” in blood donations,
leading to a temporary depression in blood donations subsequent to the use of incentives. From
a policy perspective, this reaction makes the use of incentives less attractive as it depresses
future blood donations.
Now consider the case where α > 1. In this case, having donated last period raises the
benefit from donating this period. This can be thought of as habit formation in the sense of
Stigler and Becker (1977). The temporary use of incentives has a positive effect in the medium
run. As the incentives induce more donations, more individuals will have utility αv > v over
the next period, and thus will be more likely to donate blood. In this case, the temporary use
of incentives may have medium-term benefits.10 Figure 3 provides a quantitative illustration of
the likely magnitude of such effects, calibrated to the baseline donation rate in our sample in
each panel. We use a simple example of our model, where for simplicity we choose the costs c
to follow a uniform distribution. Panel A displays the results for α = 2. The panel shows the
10In the context of exercising, Charness and Gneezy (2009) have found that a temporary incentive can have
effects on behavior beyond the period during which the incentive is offered.
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donation rate at its steady-state value in period t−1, and then increased by 10 percentage points
in response to a temporary incentive. As we explained, the behavior gradually tends back to
its steady-state value from above. One period after the incentive has been removed, donations
are still 2.5 percentage points above their steady-state value before slowly converging back to
this level. Summing over all five periods after the intervention in t, habit-forming preferences
increase blood donations by 3.1 percentage points, rendering the intervention 30 percent more
productive in the long-run. In contrast, Panel B of Figure 3 displays the calibrations for the
case of guilt-driven preferences with α = 0.5, i.e. a case in which donating in the next period
feels only half as urgent than if the individual had not donated the period before. As the figure
shows, there is a sharp drop by more than 4 percentage points below the steady state in the
period after the incentives have been used. Donation rates then oscillate and tend towards the
steady state value, leading to a long run loss of 3.1 percentage points in the post-incentives
period. In other words, the long-run efficiency of incentives is reduced by roughly 30 percent.
Crowding-Out of Intrinsic Motivation: Research in psychology has shown that when external
rewards are given for an activity an individual intrinsically enjoys, this may undermine her
intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Lepper and Greene, 1978). In terms of our model,
this implies that an individual’s utility in the absence of incentives is
ui(dt, 0) = (νih(0)− c)dt (3)
If incentives are introduced, this changes the intrinsic valuation of the activity according to the
function h():
ui(dt,mt) = (νih(mt) +mt − c)dt (4)
The use of incentives decreases the intrinsic benefit of donating blood, captured by a decreasing
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Figure 3: Simulated Donation Patterns with Intertemporal Spillovers in Utility
.4
.4
5
.5
.5
5
.6
Do
na
tio
n 
fre
qu
en
cy
 
t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
 
Period
A. Alpha > 1
.4
.4
5
.5
.5
5
.6
Do
na
tio
n 
fre
qu
en
cy
 
t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
 
Period
B. Alpha < 1
Notes: Calculations are based on the model details in the appendix. Panel A displays the
response to incentives with positive habit formation, where α = 2. Panel B displays the case
of diminishing utility after a donation, where α = 0.5. In both cases, the benefit of donating
blood v is calibrated such that it corresponds to the baseline donation rate of 47 percent. The
incentive m = 0.1 in period t increases donation rates by 10 percentage points. δ = 0.99.
function h(m).11 As a consequence, the positive relative price effect might be reversed.12 Overall,
the model with intrinsic motivation makes no clear prediction as to how behavior responds when
incentives are provided. The sum of intrinsic and extrinsic benefits only increases, and hence
the probability to donate blood, if
h(0)− h(mt) < mt/νi, (5)
11The evidence in several papers suggests that h(m) may not be differentiable, but rather drops discontinuously
as rewards are used (Deci et al., 1999; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000)
12A similar exposition is offered in Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997).
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is not clear a priori.13 The model also implies the assertion in the psychological reasoning that
those with a particularly high intrinsic benefit from the activity experience the largest drop in
motivation, as the drop in the motivation h(m)− h(0) is scaled by νi. A higher νi thus implies
a larger drop in intrinsic motivation. So the theory predicts that highly motivated individuals
respond less to incentives than less motivated ones, or even negatively, as equation (5) is more
difficult to satisfy for a high νi.
Motivation crowing theory makes the prediction that once incentives have been used, intrinsic
motivation is reduced or destroyed and will not recover. Thus while individuals choose whether
or not to donate blood according to (3) before period t, they will choose whether or not to
donate blood after the use of incentives according to
ui(ds, 0) = (νih(ms)− c)ds (6)
with the intrinsic motivation diminished for all future periods s > t. Abstracting from other
forces, motivation crowing theory unambiguously predicts that donations decrease subsequent
to the use of incentives. Importantly, the theory predicts that only contingent incentives are
expected to crowd out intrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1999). This is particularly relevant to
our setting as all individuals who donated blood received a reward. The emphasis on contingent
incentives implies that those people for whom the reward was not announced are understood
not to experience an impact on their intrinsic motivation. Therefore, they continue to be the
relevant control group.
Summary: The behavioral consequences of incentives are separately modeled here, taking into
13This simple model of motivation crowding also captures the essence of richer models based on image concerns.
The self-signaling interpretation of the models by Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2011)
emphasizes that an individual wishes to see him- or herself as someone who likes contributing to a pro-social
activity and who is not mercenary (that is, as someone who has a low marginal utility of money). Thus, in
choosing an action, an individual also takes into account what this action signals about his or her character.
In this setting, it is possible for incentives to reduce the level of an activity. The reason being that a positive
response to such incentives may communicate an individual’s positive marginal utility of money and thereby
convey a selfish signal to his or her future selves. There are other recent models in economics with a similar
flavor whereby behavioral reactions are derived from public image motivation (Ariely et al., 2009; Ellingsen and
Johannesson, 2008). We do not refer to these models as donations in donation centers can be considered largely
private.
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account intertemporal spillovers and the possibility of motivation crowding effects. The two
forces might potentially affect behavior simultaneously. Due to the natural setting, the theories
have to be assessed based on the observed net effects on donation behavior. Ideally, the theories
captured in our simple models would make distinct predictions that allow us to discriminate
between them when confronted with the empirical evidence. The differences turn out to be
rather subtle when the predictions from both models are combined.
Six combinations can be meaningfully discussed between three cases of intertemporal utility
spillovers, i.e. α < 1 (guilt), α = 1 (no intertemporal effects) and α > 1 (habit formation), split
between whether motivation crowding is effective or not. For each of them, there are predictions
of the behavioral consequences during and after the intervention. During the experiment, utility
spillovers obviously do not matter and a positive incentive effect is expected when there is no
motivation crowding while the effect turns out to be ambiguous if motivation crowding is rele-
vant. After the intervention, predictions for the six cases are as follows: For α = 1, donations
are at the baseline level with no motivation crowding but below baseline with motivation crowd-
ing. If α < 1, there is a negative intertemporal spillover effect. With no motivation crowding,
the negative effect vanishes over time. With motivation crowding, the negative effect also gets
smaller over time but remains negative. In the case of α > 1, there is a positive intertemporal
spillover effect that decays over time. Combined with motivation crowding, it is ambiguous to
determine whether the donation level is above or below the baseline level immediately after the
intervention. However, any positive effect is decreasing and turns into a negative effect over
time. An overview of the predictions is presented in Table 2.
In addition to the listed predictions for the overall effects before and after the intervention,
there are differential predictions for more or less motivated donors. During as well as after the
provision of incentives, relatively worse outcomes are expected for the more motivated donors if
motivation crowding plays a role. However, this same prediction is also consistent with the costs
and benefits of donating blood being negatively correlated. A negative correlation might not
be expected a priori though as pro-social behavior is often observed to be positively correlated
with the level of education and thus with the opportunity costs of time. While this argument
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Table 2: Summary of the Behavioral Predictions
Intertemporal utility spillovers
α < 1 α = 1 α > 1
(Guilt) (Habit formation)
Motivation No During Homogenous increase of
crowding experiment donations across donors
out
After Decreasing No effect Decreasing
experiment negative effects positive effects
Yes During Ambiguous effect on the
experiment level of blood donations
Relatively less effective
for highly motivated donors
After Decreasing Negative level Decreasing
experiment negative effects effect positive effects
with remaining (or increasing
negative level negative effects)
effect turning into a
negative level
effect
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suggests a positive rather than a negative correlation, we cannot assess whether the respective
relationship also holds in our context. The unobserved heterogeneity in costs and benefits from
donating blood thus impedes the interpretation of differential consequences of groups of donors
solely in terms of motivation crowding theory. Of course, we still learn about the behavioral
reactions of different groups.
B. Empirical Strategy
For the outcome during the experiment, we model the probability of donating blood as
Pr(di = 1) = Pr(T
′
ctγ + x
′
iβ + δc(t) + ωc(t) + i > 0) (7)
where Tct is a vector of binary variables, indicating the treatment that was mailed out by center c
on date t. We naturally choose the condition referring to the mailings of the standard invitation
letters as our control condition. The vector γ contains the associated coefficients, indicating
how the different treatments affect the index function that determines the probability to donate
blood. The vector xi contains individual-level control variables with coefficients β. In our core
specification, xi also contains our measure of past donation intensity, which indicates the number
of times the individual showed up to donate blood out of the four previous invitations . For this
measure to be comparable across individuals, an individual needs to have received at least four
invitations prior to the experiment. We thus restrict the sample to individuals who fulfill this
criteria. We also estimate a set of center-specific weekday effects δc(t), since the different centers
have different opening hours. Finally, we estimate center-specific week fixed effects ωc(t). With
these center fixed effects in place, the treatment effects are thus identified from within-center
variation in treatment conditions within a week. This safeguards against identifying effects based
on differences across centers, since not all the treatments were implemented in every center. We
assume that i follows a logistic distribution and estimate a logit model by maximum likelihood.
For the most part, we calculate the marginal effects ∂ Pr(di=1)∂zi and report those rather than the
coefficient estimates of the index function. As we explained in the previous subsection, the
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experiment is randomized at the day × center level. We therefore follow the recommendation
to cluster the standard errors at the level of randomization (Abadie et al., 2017).
In order to examine how the response to the experiment depends on the individual’s prior
frequency of donation, we estimate equation (7) separately for two groups of individuals: those
having donated zero, one or two times in response to the last four invitations, and those having
donated three or four times in response to the last four invitations.
We analyse the effects of the treatments on blood donations after the experiment was con-
cluded by estimating an equation of the form
dki = T
′
ctγ
k + x′iβ
k + δkc (t) + ω
k
c (t) + 
k
i (8)
where dki indicates the number of blood donations in the k months after the experiment had
concluded. Unlike the experimental period, we are not able to condition on who received an
invitation for the post-experimental period, so we simply count the number of times that the
individual donated blood. We estimate equation (8) for five time horizons of k = 3, 6, 9, 12 and
15 months after the experiment. We estimate the equations by OLS and again cluster at the
level of the randomization (date of the original invitation to the experiment at the particular
center). As a robustness check, we repeated the analysis using poisson regressions, and reached
the same conclusions. The results are available upon request.
IV. Results
A. Response During the Experiment
Overall Treatment Effects: Figure 4 offers a first descriptive presentation of the outcomes in
the different experimental conditions. It shows the differences in donation rates between an
intervention treatment and the baseline treatment in which the standard invitation was sent
out. In our analysis, the outcome variable is normalized by donation center × donor type mean
values and the standard errors are displayed as vertical lines around the differences in donation
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rates. The figure reveals a moderate increase of 1.3 percentage points in the donation rate when
the appeal alone is sent out to donors, with the standard error indicating that the difference
to the baseline invitation is likely not statistically significant. Turning to the two rewards used
in the experiment, the results show an increase of 2.3 percentage points in the donation rate
when a free cholesterol test is offered to donors. For the lottery ticket, the descriptive evidence
suggests that it raises donation rates quite substantially by approximately 4 percentage points,
and that the effect is likely statistically significant.
Figure 4: Descriptive Evidence of the Overall Treatment Effects
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Notes: The outcome variable is normalized by donation center × donor type mean values.
Treatment effects are calculated relative to the outcomes with standard invitation. The vertical
lines indicate the standard errors of the differences. The sample is restricted to the 9,731 donors
who have received at least four previous invitations to donate blood. “Appeal” indicates that
a special card was added to the invitation, calling subjects up to donate. ”CH test” means
that together with the card, subjects were offered a free cholesterol (CH) test if they showed
up.“Lottery ticket” refers to cards on which a lottery ticket was offered to donors.
As the experiment is only randomized within centers across days, the averages across periods
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may overstate the precision with which the differences across treatments are measured. In order
to provide a formal statistical test, we estimate equation (7) in three versions. In the first
column of Table 3, we only include the controls ensuring randomization (but do not take into
account donor type). We add demographic controls in the second column, and finally constrain
the sample to the individuals who have received at least four previous invitations in the third
column. The first and the second estimation are thus for the full sample, while the third
estimation is restricted to donors with a known donor history. As in the figure above, the
reference condition is the standard invitation. Differences in the number of observations across
estimations arise due to the dropping of observations if information on the control variables is
missing or due to perfect prediction in the logit models.
The results in the table show that the statistical precision is increased once we condition
on previous donations and the center-level controls required by the level of randomization. Our
preferred specification is presented in the third column of Table 3, with all the controls in place.
While the point estimates are similar across all specifications, the third column offers the best
statistical power.
Turning to the key treatment of interest, we find that the lottery ticket significantly increases
blood donations. The point estimate is comparable across the specifications, and statistically
significant at the 5 percent level in our preferred specification, i.e. the third column. The effect
size of 5.6 percentage points is considerable given that the baseline donation rate is approximately
50 percent. However, the lottery ticket reward was combined with an appeal to donate. We
can control for this by comparing the effect of the lottery ticket to the appeal treatment as
both treatments contained the same message. As can be seen in the table, the appeal treatment
is not statistically significant in any of the specifications. In column (3), its point estimate is
near 1 percentage point and with the added precision of the controls, we are able to reject the
hypothesis that the lottery ticket and the appeal have the same effect (p = 0.05, see the bottom
panel of the table). The cholesterol test always has a small positive point estimate going up to
1.7 percentage points. However, in this specification, it is neither statistically significant, nor
statistically distinguishable from the effect of the lottery ticket.
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Table 3: Overall Treatment Effects on Blood Donations
Dependent variable: Solicitation resulted in blood donation (=1)
Marginal effects from logit models
Appeal 0.031 0.026 0.008
(0.022) (0.022) (0.015)
Cholesterol test 0.008 0.012 0.017
(0.022) (0.021) (0.017)
Lottery ticket 0.041* 0.048** 0.056**
(0.025) (0.022) (0.024)
Control variables
Gender (female = 1) –0.039*** –0.025*
(0.012) (0.015)
No. prev. inv. followed
1 out of 4 0.251***
(0.019)
2 out of 4 0.376***
(0.016)
3 out of 4 0.499***
(0.012)
4 out of 4 0.639***
(0.010)
Mean donation rate 0.447 0.447 0.459
in invitation-only group
Differences between treatments
Lottery ticket vs. ... (p-values)
Appeal 0.705 0.357 0.049
Cholesterol test 0.294 0.201 0.159
Other controls? No Yes Yes
Received at least 4 No No Yes
previous invitations
Pseudo-R2 0.019 0.101 0.262
N 11,319 11,319 9,723
Notes: All specifications include a full set of dummy variables for donation center × week and
donation center × weekday. Other controls include a full set of dummy variables indicating
the periodicity of invitations as required by the donors. Baseline treatment is the standard
invitation. “Appeal” indicates that a special card was added to the invitation, calling subjects
up to donate. “Cholesterol test” means that together with the card, subjects were offered a free
cholesterol test if they showed up.“Lottery ticket” refers to cards on which a lottery ticket was
offered to donors.
25
Overall, the only treatment that significantly increases blood donations is the lottery ticket.
Thus far, this result is consistent with either model described above, the standard model in
economics and the alternative on motivation crowding.
Differential Treatment Effects by Donor Motivation: In order to discriminate between different
theories, we explore the respective predictions in greater detail. In particular, the theory of
motivation crowding predicts that highly motivated donors are negatively affected by the use
of incentives to a larger extent. We use our measure of previous donations in response to the
last four invitations as an indicator of donor motivation. We group donors into frequent and
infrequent donors, depending on whether they responded to at least three of the previous four
invitations. The treatment effects, based on the same normalizations as in Figure 2, are displayed
for the two groups in Figure 5. The figure suggests a clear qualitative difference in how frequent
and infrequent donors respond to the experiment. Frequent donors seem to be more or less
unmoved by any of the treatments. If anything, the appeal appears to reduce turnout among
frequent donors.
In contrast, the treatment effects displayed in panel A of the figure suggests more sensitivity
to the experimental treatments by infrequent donors. They seem somewhat more likely to
donate even when receiving the appeal alone. The point estimates of the treatment effects of
the appeal and the cholesterol test are both around 3 percentage points. Interestingly, the lottery
ticket evokes an even larger response and donation rates increase by around 6 percentage points.
Given that the mean donation rate for the less motivated donors is only about 26 percent, this
represents a large increase in relative terms.
We provide a formal statistical test in Table 4. The test confirms the visual inspection from
the graph, and provides marginal effects together with the correct standard errors. Turning first
to the infrequent donors, the results show a strong increase in the donation rate in response to
the lottery ticket: with all the controls in place, we estimate that donation rates increase by
approximately 8 percentage points for this first group of donors. The estimations also reveal
that the cholesterol test has a comparatively small effect of around 2 percentage points on blood
donations, whereby the hypothesis of no effect cannot be statistically rejected (see also Goette
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Figure 5: Treatment Effects by Frequency of Prior Donations
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Note: See Figure 4.
et al., 2009). A statistical test also reveals that the lottery ticket works significantly better than
the cholesterol test, and also somewhat better than an appeal alone, even though the appeal
has a positive effect of nearly 4 percentage points on donations.
Compare this to the results we find for frequent donors in the third and fourth columns
of Table 4. As the figure indicates, there is no significant response to either of the reward
treatments, i.e. free cholesterol test or lottery ticket. All the point estimates are small, and,
for the lottery ticket, negative, albeit not statistically significant. If anything, the appeal alone
seems to marginally decrease the chance of donating blood. While we reject the hypothesis of
no effect of the treatments on infrequent donors (p ≤ 0.01 in both specifications), we cannot
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Table 4: Treatment Effects for Frequent and Infrequent Donors
Dependent variable: Solicitation resulted in blood donation (=1)
Marginal effects from logit models
Infrequent donors Frequent donors
Appeal 0.039** 0.037** –0.032* –0.036**
(0.020) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
Cholesterol test 0.026 0.023 0.000 0.002
(0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018)
Lottery ticket 0.077*** 0.082*** –0.035 –0.013
(0.027) (0.023) (0.037) (0.034)
Control variables
Gender (female =1) –0.015 –0.021
(0.013) (0.017)
No. prev. inv. followed
1 out of 4 0.201***
(0.021)
2 out of 4 0.331***
(0.023)
4 out of 4 –0.153***
(0.013)
Mean donation rate 0.245 0.245 0.761 0.761
in invitation-only group
Differences between treatments
Lottery ticket vs. ... (p-values)
Appeal 0.084 0.028 0.467 0.252
Cholesterol test 0.058 0.015 0.180 0.336
Different response
to treatments? p < 0.008a p < 0.003b
Other controls? No Yes No Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.026 0.114 0.030 0.092
N 5,647 5,647 4,079 4,072
Notes: See Table 3. a χ2(3)-test for equality of treatment effects in the first and the third
column. b χ2(3)-test for equality of treatment effects in the second and fourth column.
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reject non-response to any treatment at conventional significance levels for frequent donors (p ≈
0.08 in the third and fourth column). Importantly, we can also test whether the responses to the
treatments in the two subgroups of donors are identical by comparing the estimated coefficients.
We clearly reject that they are the same (p < 0.01 in either case). Thus, intrinsic donor
motivation, measured by previous donation rates, modulates the response to the experiment.
Treatment Effects for Alternative Sample Splits: In order to interpret the latter results as donor
motivation moderating the response to the experiment, we need to rule out that other factors,
that may be correlated with the frequency of donation, explain the heterogeneity in the response
to the experiment. Donation frequency may be correlated with age, gender and whether or not
the individual has signed up for scheduled invitations. We address concerns that each of these
factors could, in fact, moderate the response to the experiment rather than the intensity of past
donations.
We approach the issue empirically by estimating equation (7) with all the control variables
included for three alternative splits of the sample. Table 5 presents the results. We begin by
examining whether men and women respond differently to the rewards. Since women react
somewhat less often to invitations, the difference being around 3 percentage points according to
Table 3, it could be that women respond more strongly to rewards. The first two columns of
Table 5 display the result that no such general tendency is observed.14 While the point estimates
for the treatment effects in the women sample seem larger for the appeal and the cholesterol
test, there is almost no difference for the lottery ticket. However, the large standard errors of the
treatment effects prevent us from drawing strong conclusions. A formal test of the equality of
the treatment coefficients for men and women cannot be rejected. Next, we examine whether age
moderates the differences in the response to the treatment. Age is positively correlated with the
response behavior to invitations, and it is possible that young donors show a stronger response
to the appeal and the rewards than elder donors, as marginal costs might hinder many to donate.
The third and fourth column of Table 5 display the results for the two age groups obtained by
14Mellstro¨m and Johannesson (2008) find gender differences in the response to incentives for blood donations
in a setting in which image motivation is relevant. In other research on motivational crowding, no systematic
gender differences are observed (Deci et al., 1999).
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a split at the median age of 45. It shows that the point estimates of the treatment effects are
indeed larger for the young than for the old donors. However, a statistical test again cannot
reject the null of no difference in treatment effects between the two groups. Finally, we split the
sample by whether or not an individual has signed up to receive invitations by some periodicity.
Individuals who have signed up for regular invitations tend to donate somewhat more often,
though not much (as they can, for instance, also sign up to receive only one invitation per year).
Perhaps the heterogeneity in the response comes from one set of donors being rather rigid about
blood donations (those who sign up for scheduled invitations) and the other set being more
flexible. The fifth and the sixth column of Table 5 present the results. Again, there is no
statistically discernible difference in the response to the four treatments, which is indicated by
the high p-value of a formal test of the null of no treatment differences between the two groups.
To summarize, none of the alternative explanations for why previous response intensity
moderates the reaction to the experiment can be supported with the data.
Theoretical Interpretation of the Findings: Having set these alternative explanation aside, we
conclude that it is individual differences in the motivation to donate blood that create the dif-
ferential response to the experiment. However, which model do the results from this subsection
support? Motivational crowding predicts that individuals with high intrinsic motivation expe-
rience the strongest drop in this motivation if extrinsic incentives are used. On the one hand,
this is consistent with the result that infrequent donors respond strongly and positively to the
extrinsic incentive (the lottery ticket), while there is a net zero effect on the highly motivated
donors. Thereby the latter net effect can be understood as the result of some of their intrinsic
motivation being destroyed and simultaneously being countered by the incentive effect of the
lottery ticket. On the other hand, the results are also consistent with a standard model in
economics and a situation in which the distribution of marginal costs has more density at the
motivation levels of the marginal infrequent than the marginal frequent donors.
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The models only make distinctive predictions for donations after the incentives are removed.
Motivational crowding theory predicts that motivation is destroyed long-term and implies lower
donation rates after the use of incentives. The standard model may also predict post-intervention
effects if preferences for blood donation are habit-forming, or guilt-driven, as we explained in the
previous section. However, these responses (a decreasing positive response in the case of habit
formation, and a decreasing negative effect in the case of guilt) are qualitatively in sharp contrast
with the predictions of the motivation crowding model which suggest negative treatment effects
in the longer term, independent of the intertemporal utility spillovers. We turn to an empirical
test of these implications in the next subsection.
B. Response After the Experiment
Average Effects: In order to examine the response to the treatments after the experiment, we
estimate linear regressions for the number of donations three, six, nine, twelve and fifteen months
after the experiment, as specified in equation (8). The estimated coefficients are presented in
Table A3. In order to gain a more intuitive impression of the cumulative changes in the number
of donations for a given time window, we have also plotted the estimates in Figure 6 for each of
the treatments separately. The first observation in each of the panels is the estimated change in
the probability to donate, for comparability also estimated using OLS, based on the specification
in the third column in Table 3. Around the point estimates, we display the 50, 75 and 95 percent
confidence intervals of the estimates.
Our main interest is to examine whether the use of incentives decreased blood donations
subsequent to the experiment, and whether this effect is temporary (due to intertemporal utility
spillovers) or permanent (as in the motivational-crowding model). Looking at the overall results,
there is no evidence that blood donations decrease subsequent to the offering of rewards. In
particular, in the case of the lottery ticket (panel A in Figure 6), the point estimates are positive.
The 95% confidence interval shows that we can reject even small decreases in donations following
the first-time use of incentives. If anything, the graph is mildly suggestive of habit-forming pref-
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erences as modeled and illustrated in Figure 3, with a positive effect slowly vanishing. However,
apart from being able to reject small negative effects, we do not have enough precision to take
a strong stance on whether preferences for blood donations are habit forming. Panels B and
C in Figure 6 display the changes in donations subsequent to the intervention involving a free
cholesterol test or an appeal. There are no statistically significant effects observed, with the null
effect within the 95-percent confidence interval, for both of them. Taken together, the overall
evaluation of the blood donations up to 15 months after the experiment shows no statistically
significant effects, but with positive point estimates for the lottery ticket and rather small nega-
tive ones for the cholesterol test. The evidence thus does not support the worrisome predictions
of the motivation crowding model for blood donations.
Differential Treatment Effects by Donor Motivation: As before, we split the sample by the
motivation to donate blood as measured based on behavior prior to the experiment, and estimate
equation (8) for the two groups of donors. The results are reported in Tables A4 and A5 and
displayed in Figures 7, 8 and 9. Formal tests comparing the two sets of estimates fail to reject
the null that they are identical for any of the time windows. Thus, we find no statistically
significant differences in the behavior of the individuals after the intervention from the different
treatments, in contrast to what we find during the experiment.
Theoretical Interpretation of the Findings: Overall, the evidence favors the standard model
in economics. While we find that previous donor motivation moderates the response to the
experiment, as predicted by the motivation crowding model, this result is also consistent with a
standard model of preference heterogeneity. Furthermore, the behavioral pattern in donations
subsequent to the experiment offers no systematic evidence for the predictions of the motivation
crowding model. Our best interpretation is that the qualitative features resemble most those of
a model with habit formation.
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Figure 7: Long-run Effects of the Lottery Ticket by Frequency of Prior Donations
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Notes: See Figure 6. The cumulative effects on donations and their confidence intervals are
calculated based on the estimates in Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix.
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Figure 8: Long-run Effects of the Cholesterol Test by Frequency of Prior Donations
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Notes: See Figure 6. The cumulative effects on donations and their confidence intervals are
calculated based on the estimates in Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix.
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Figure 9: Long-run Effects of the Appeal by Frequency of Prior Donations
-.1
2
-.0
8
-.0
4
0
.0
4
.0
8
.1
2
Ex
pe
rim
en
ta
l e
ffe
ct 
/ c
um
ula
tiv
e
ef
fe
ct 
in 
po
st-
pe
rio
d 
 
During
experiment
3 6 9 12 15
 
Months after initial invitation
A. Infrequent donors
 
-.1
2
-.0
8
-.0
4
0
.0
4
.0
8
.1
2
Ex
pe
rim
en
ta
l e
ffe
ct 
/ c
um
ula
tiv
e
ef
fe
ct 
in 
po
st-
pe
rio
d 
 
During
experiment
3 6 9 12 15
 
Months after initial invitation
B. Frequent donors
 
Notes: See Figure 6. The cumulative effects on donations and their confidence intervals are
calculated based on the estimates in Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix.
V. Concluding Remarks
Whether material rewards are an effective means to increase pro-social behavior is highly con-
troversial. Our study offers evidence from a large-scale field experiment in the context of blood
donation, which is often considered prototypical of an intrinsically motivated voluntary behav-
ior. Before we put our study into perspective and briefly discuss its implications and limitations
in the context of blood donations, we attempt to precisely summarize our analysis in relation to
the general academic debate.
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A. Summary of the Experiment
Do private incentives in the form of material rewards offer an (extrinsic) motivation to donate
blood or do they crowd out intrinsic motivation to do so, as predicted by theories of intrinsic
motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey, 1997; Gneezy et al., 2011)? To address this question,
in the key experimental condition of our study, individuals were offered a lottery ticket if they
donate during the summer months (often plagued by a shortage of blood). Compared to individ-
uals in the control condition who only received the standard invitation to donate (without any
mention of the shortage), we find that the lottery ticket significantly increased blood donations.
Individuals in the lottery ticket condition have a 5.6 percentage points higher probability of
donating over a baseline probability of 46 percent in the control condition.
The announcement of the lottery was combined with the message that blood supply was
expected to run low. For this reason, an additional control for the effect of the pure information
about a possible shortage was implemented (similar to Sun et al., 2016). In this condition,
the standard invitation was combined with a message about the special need during summer
presented in the exact same way as in the main reward treatment. As offering a tangible material
reward might also be seen as a form of costly signaling, we control for this interpretation in
another condition in which individuals were offered a free (non-transferable) cholesterol test. We
find that neither an appeal nor the offer of a cholesterol test raises the propensity to donate.15
While our main findings are consistent with the standard model in economics, they are also
consistent with motivational crowding (with the relative price effect mitigating the impact from
motivational crowing out). Crucially, our setup allowed us to probe deeper into the underlying
behavioral mechanisms for three reasons. First, donors were previously not offered rewards in
return for their blood donation. Thus, using incentives on this population has the largest possible
effect on intrinsic motivation. Second, the rewards were announced to the donors privately, and
15The result that specific material rewards are ineffective in raising donation rates is not uncommon. For
instance, the offer of a free t-shirt was ineffective in Reich et al. (2006). However, the ineffectiveness of a reward
in the heath domain, i.e. in the same domain as the pro-social activity, might come as a surprise. Indeed, in
related research, offering a comprehensive blood check turned out effective in motivating blood donations (Leipnitz
et al., 2018).
38
blood donations took place in the relative anonymity of a medical center. This makes it unlikely
that the use of incentives creates an image concern as in Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) and Ariely
et al. (2009). Third, in our experiment, all donors were treated the same way at the donation
center. That is, even donors who received the control (or appeal) invitation received a lottery
ticket. However, to them, the lottery ticket was an unexpected gift rather than an incentive. This
allows us to examine how the contingency of the lottery ticket affects subsequent motivation,
exactly as in the experiments in social psychology (Deci et al., 1999).
Theories of intrinsic motivation make two clear predictions with respect to crowding out:
first, they predict that highly motivated donors experience stronger crowding out effects than
donors with lower baseline motivation. Second, they predict that intrinsic motivation will re-
main lower subsequent to the use of incentives. Our data allow tests of both predictions. We
use the responsiveness to invitations prior to the experiment as our measure of intrinsic moti-
vation. Individuals who rarely responded (low baseline motivation) reacted very strongly to the
treatments. Offering a lottery ticket increased their probability to donate blood by 8 percent-
age points over a baseline probability of 30 percent. There is also a significantly positive, but
smaller, response to the appeal condition, whereas the free cholesterol test is ineffective. In both
cases, the lottery ticket condition has a significantly stronger effect on the probability to donate
blood than the appeal and free cholesterol test conditions.
In contrast, individuals with a high baseline motivation did not respond to either the lottery
ticket or the cholesterol test as a reward. If anything, they respond negatively to being sent an
appeal, compared to the control condition of a standard invitation.
We also followed the donation frequency of our experimental population up to 15 months
after the experiment. For this period, the SRC returned to their previous regime of not offering
any rewards for blood donations. We do not find any materially significant evidence of crowding
out of intrinsic motivation through material rewards. The precision of our estimates is sufficient
to reject even small negative effects. Our setup allows us to follow almost identical identification
strategy as the lab experiments (no experience with incentives for blood donations, all individuals
receive reward after donating, but only one group was offered the incentive as a contingency).
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We do not find a pattern indicating a lower motivation after having been offered a contingent
reward. The results also do not suggest any obvious pattern of intertemporal substitution that
would follow from a standard economic model, and offer only weak and statistically insignificant
hint at habit formation. This latter interpretation, however, should be taken with a grain of
salt. The ideal setting to test for intertemporal substitution is one in which an incentive is
applied to one group, while the other group is not treated in any way. While it is true that the
control group received no incentive during the experiment, the donors did receive a gift after the
donation, which may have had an effect on their subsequent motivation. While we doubt that
this effect would be large, the lack of a “control of the control” that is completely untouched
does not allow us to draw strong conclusions with regard to intertemporal substitution or habit
formation.
B. Implications and Limitations
Overall, our results suggest that selective incentives and pro-social motivations may coexist even
in domains that heavily rely on people’s intrinsic motivation and in which usually rewards are
not offered for voluntary contributions. Thus, in light of the recurring seasonal shortages and a
steady tightening of donor criteria, material rewards may prove useful to motivate past donors
to donate more blood. This finding complements previous evidence that material rewards are
effective in increasing donations in the short-term in the context where rewards have become
common (Lacetera et al., 2012, 2014). Our results should not, however, be construed as evidence
that instituting a permanent regime of monetary incentives would have positive effects on the
level of blood donations. Money may not be perceived the same way as the lottery tickets in our
experiment. Moreover, there was essentially no public image concern, as in Be´nabou and Tirole
(2006), so an important channel by which incentives may become ineffective for the specific
population of donors was shut out. Furthermore, a switch to a regime offering rewards on a
permanent basis may also be interpreted by donors as evidence that the donation service is not
altruistic, and may trigger effects along the line described in Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008).
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However, while our evidence suggests that incentives can be used as a stop-gap measure
when shortages occur, further research is needed to address how permanently switching to
reward schemes affects the pro-social motivation of blood donors. Neither our results nor that
of others (e.g. Lacetera et al., 2014) should be taken as evidence that a policy shift from an all-
volunteer system would be desirable. Such a shift may well induce changes in the composition
of the individuals willing to donate.
Furthermore, the fact that incentives are not harmful does not imply that they are the
most effective policy choice. Other mechanisms to stimulate blood donations in situations of
shortages may be more cost effective. For instance, Bruhin et al. (2015) show that a phone call,
aimed at overcoming shortages in particular blood types, is a highly effective tool to increase
turnout. They show that the phone call increases turnout by 10 percentage points uniformly
in the population of donors. The comparison is particularly interesting, as the recipients of the
phone call were individuals registered with the same blood donation service as in our study.
The much larger overall effect compared to our lottery ticket is striking, and suggests that the
phone call taps into different motivations. Further research is needed to delve into the types of
policy interventions which are relatively more effective in the context of blood donations. This
may help to develop a common framework to also understand problems of recruitment (see, e.g.,
Iajya et al., 2013; Stutzer et al., 2011), retention of first time donors (see, e.g., Bagot et al.,
2016), as well as the retention of long-term donors (see, e.g., Chell et al., 2018).
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A Appendix
A. An Illustrative Model of Blood Donations
Suppose that an individual’s period utility is given by
u(dt, dt−1) =
 dt(v − ct) if dt−1 = 0dt(αv − ct) if dt−1 = 1
where dt ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether the individual donates blood (dt = 1) or not. As before,
v is the utility from donating blood, and ct is the cost of donating blood in this period with
distribution function Fc(x). The parameter α 6= 1 captures the way in which a donation in
the last period affects the utility from donating blood in this period. If α > 1, this can be
interpreted as habit formation: donating is more pleasant if one does it regularly. The model
also allows for the possibility that donating is less pleasant or feels less urgent if one has done it
recently (α < 1), for example because people feel guilt in reaction to the time that has elapsed
since their last donation.
Consider an individual who did not donate in t− 1. Her lifetime utility is given by
V 0t = δE(V
0) + max
dt
(
(v − ct) + δ(E(V 1)− E(V 0))dt
)
(9)
where we impose stationarity right from the beginning. Conversely, for an individual who
donated in t− 1, her lifetime utility is
V 1t = δE(V
0) + max
dt
(
(αv − ct) + δ(E(V 1)− E(V 0))dt
)
(10)
Applying the expectation operation to (9), we obtain
E(V 0) = δE(V 0) + p0
(
(v − c0) + δ(E(V 1)− E(V 0))) (11)
where p0 = Pr(ct ≤ v + δ(E(V 1)− E(V 0)) and c0 = E(ct|ct ≤ v + δ(E(V 1)− E(V 0)). To keep
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this example simple, assume that ct is uniform on [0, 1]. In this case, c
0 = 0.5(v + δ∆V ) and
p0 = 2c0 = (v + δ∆V ), where ∆V ≡ E(V 1)− E(V 0). Thus,
E(V 0) = δE(V 0) + 0.5(v + δ∆V )2 (12)
Similarly, we take the expectation of (10) to obtain
E(V 1) = δE(V 0) + p1
(
(αv − c1) + δ(E(V 1)− E(V 0)))
where c1 = αv + δ∆V and p1 = 2c1. Thus,
E(V 1) = δE(V 0) + 0.5(αv + δ∆V )2 (13)
Subtracting (12) from (13), we obtain
∆V = 0.5v2(α2 − 1) + (α− 1)δv∆V (14)
⇔ ∆V = 0.5v2 α
2 − 1
1− δv(α− 1)
Notice that as 1 > α > 0, ∆V < 0 since the reduction in the utility α reduces the utility from
donating blood this period. As α > 1, ∆V > 0, reflecting the higher utility if the individual
starts from a situation of having donated in the period before.
The preceding calculations are based on the case where the probability of donating blood is
strictly less than one, a necessary condition to this is δ(α−1) < 1. However, if α is large enough,
this condition may not be satisfied as the individual will donate blood in any case. Formally,
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this can be seen by plugging the solution for ∆V into the definition of p0
p0 = v + δ∆V = v + 0.5v2
α2 − 1
1− δv(α− 1) = v
1− δv(1− α) + 0.5δ(α2 − 1)v
1− δv(α− 1)
= v
1− δv(α− 1)(1− 0.5(α+ 1))
1− δv(α− 1) = v
1 + 0.5δv(α− 1)2
1− δv(α− 1)
This probability is less than one if v
(
1 + 0.5δv(α− 1)2) < 1− δv(α− 1), a necessary condition
to which is 1− δv(α− 1) > 0⇔ δv(α− 1) < 1.
We use this model to calibrate a numerical simulation of the use of incentives, displayed in
Figure 3. We calculate ∆, p0, p1 in the absence of incentives using parameter values δ = 0.99
and values of 2 and 0.5 for α, respectively. The steady state donation rate q in this model is
given by
q = qp1 + (1− q)p0 (15)
where the right-hand side of equation (15) is the composition of the population in the last period,
and the left-hand side is the fraction of individuals who will be donating this period. Solving
for q yields
q =
p0
1− p1 + p0
For each of the two cases α = 0.5, 2, we choose v such that q matches the average donation
rate in our sample (0.477). We then shock individuals in one period with a one-time incentive
of m = 0.1 in utility terms, equivalent to a 10 percentage point increase in the donation rate.
We subsequently calculate how the donation choices tend back to the steady state. While the
model could be solved analytically, we approximated the solution by simulating it numerically
using N = 1, 000, 000 individuals.
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B. Tables
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics (by center and treatment)
Age Gender Donations Signed up for N
(female = 1) following last fixed interval
four invitations of inv. (=1)
By center and treatment:
1
Baseline 44.25 0.39 1.92 0.31 1,647
(13.96) (0.49) (1.55) (0.46)
Appeal 45.12 0.38 2.03 0.30 1,211
(14.29) (0.49) (1.60) (0.46)
Cholesterol test 43.45 0.39 1.84 0.28 2,524
(14.07) (0.49) (1.59) ( 0.45)
Overall p-value 0.2686
2
Baseline 48.07 0.34 2.12 0.16 361
(12.97) (0.48) (1.42) (0.37)
Appeal 48.62 0.37 2.33 0.09 323
(13.03) (0.48) (1.28) (0.29)
Cholesterol test 48.68 0.31 2.24 0.15 555
(12.95) (0.46) (1.34) (0.36)
Overall p-value 0.0751
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Descriptive statistics by center and
treatment condition are calculated based on the sample with at least four previous invitations.
The overall p-values for balance checks are obtained from seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
model for the four characteristics.
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics (by center and treatment) - continued
Age Gender Donations Signed up for N
(female = 1) following last fixed interval
four invitations of inv. (=1)
By center and treatment:
3
Baseline 45.84 0.41 2.07 0.65 650
(13.58) (0.49) (1.56) (0.48)
Appeal 45.60 0.44 2.21 0.69 487
(13.48) (0.50) (1.52) (0.46)
Lottery ticket 44.47 0.38 1.83 0.63 989
(13.92) (0.49) (1.53) (0.48)
Overall p-value 0.6252
4
Baseline 43.50 0.50 1.95 0.35 315
(13.07) (0.50) (1.55) (0.48)
Appeal 44.31 0.40 2.04 0.28 203
(12.61) (0.49) (1.60) (0.45)
Cholesterol test 42.29 0.41 1.84 0.27 467
(13.36) (0.49) (1.62) (0.45)
Overall p-value 0.8670
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Descriptive statistics by center and
treatment condition are calculated based on the sample with at least four previous invitations.
The overall p-values for balance checks are obtained from seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
model for the four characteristics.
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Table A2: The Distribution of Treatments
(Number of Subjects)
Donation center
Treatment 1 2 3 4 Total
Baseline 1,987 512 393 790 3,682
Appeal 1,378 373 601 261 2,613
Cholesterol test 2,911 615 579 4,105
Lottery ticket 1,160 1,160
Total 6,185 1,392 2,521 1,222 11,320
Notes: The sample refers to the full sample in Table 2.
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Table A3: Long-run Effects of the Experiment
Number of donations within different periods after the intervention
OLS estimates
1 to 3 1 to 6 1 to 9 1 to 12 1 to 15
months months months months months
Appeal 0.009 0.002 0.030 0.040 0.025
(0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.027) (0.030)
CH Test –0.003 –0.028* –0.045** –0.047* –0.043
(0.013) (0.016) (0.022) (0.028) (0.032)
Lottery Ticket 0.039** 0.024 0.037* 0.053** 0.056*
(0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.030)
Age 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.035*** 0.050***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Age squared –0.000** –0.000** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender (female = 1) –0.018* –0.048*** –0.092*** –0.141*** –0.187***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.022) (0.028)
No. prev. inv. followed
1 out of 4 0.137*** 0.299*** 0.451*** 0.595*** 0.710***
(0.016) (0.025) (0.033) (0.041) (0.051)
2 out of 4 0.230*** 0.520*** 0.832*** 1.102*** 1.344***
(0.017) (0.023) (0.033) (0.041) (0.050)
3 out of 4 0.330*** 0.768*** 1.176*** 1.599*** 1.978***
(0.018) (0.027) (0.037) (0.047) (0.056)
4 out of 4 0.470*** 1.044*** 1.557*** 2.091*** 2.588***
(0.018) (0.027) (0.036) (0.048) (0.058)
Mean donations 0.332 0.726 1.085 1.453 1.774
in invitation-only group
R2 0.246 0.393 0.451 0.488 0.507
N 9,593 9,593 9,593 9,593 9,593
Notes: See Table 3. All specifications include controls for the required periodicity of invitations.
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Table A4: Long-run Effects of the Experiment for Infrequent Donors
Number of donations within different periods after the intervention
OLS estimates
1 to 3 1 to 6 1 to 9 1 to 12 1 to 15
months months months months months
Appeal –0.010 –0.012 0.015 0.011 0.027
(0.015) (0.021) (0.026) (0.033) (0.037)
CH Test 0.006 –0.019 –0.024 –0.025 –0.014
(0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.026) (0.032)
Lottery Ticket 0.010 0.015 0.000 0.028 0.041
(0.019) (0.029) (0.032) (0.041) (0.052)
Age 0.005* 0.006 0.011* 0.015** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Age squared –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 –0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender (female = 1) –0.004 –0.028* –0.049** –0.083*** –0.114***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.020) (0.025) (0.028)
No. prev. inv. followed
1 out of 4 0.134*** 0.282*** 0.417*** 0.546*** 0.654***
(0.015) (0.023) (0.030) (0.037) (0.045)
2 out of 4 0.231*** 0.504*** 0.802*** 1.061*** 1.299***
(0.016) (0.022) (0.031) (0.038) (0.045)
Mean donations 0.178 0.381 0.568 0.755 0.906
in invitation-only group
R2 0.116 0.215 0.278 0.298 0.307
Obs 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564
Note: See Table A3.
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Table A5: Long-run Effects of the Experiment for Frequent Donors
Number of donations within different periods after the intervention
OLS estimates
1 to 3 1 to 6 1 to 9 1 to 12 1 to 15
months months months months months
Appeal 0.022 0.009 0.033 0.068 0.005
(0.022) (0.032) (0.042) (0.052) (0.057)
CH Test –0.017 –0.041 –0.088** –0.094 –0.108*
(0.023) (0.031) (0.044) (0.059) (0.065)
Lottery Ticket 0.064 0.016 0.064 0.064 0.063
(0.045) (0.042) (0.054) (0.057) (0.076)
Age 0.005 0.019*** 0.041*** 0.067*** 0.096***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013)
Age squared –0.000 –0.000** –0.000*** –0.001*** –0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender (female = 1) –0.037* –0.073*** –0.144*** –0.219*** –0.286***
(0.019) (0.025) (0.030) (0.040) (0.052)
No. prev. inv. followed
3 out of 4 –0.111*** –0.230*** –0.312*** –0.405*** –0.499***
(0.016) (0.022) (0.029) (0.036) (0.043)
Mean donations 0.354 1.177 1.762 2.367 2.911
in invitation-only group
R2 0.216 0.194 0.222 0.232 0.247
Obs 4,029 4,029 4,029 4,029 4,029
Note: See Table A3.
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